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Abstract 
 
The present paper provides a descriptive analysis of the second-degree price discrimination 
problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. By imposing a simple two-sided framework 
with two distinct types of agents on one of its market sides, it will be shown that under 
incomplete information, the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly 
reduced below the benchmark level (complete information). In addition, the paper’s findings 
imply that it is feasible in the optimum to charge higher payments from low-demand agents if 
the extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side is assumed to be bundle-
specific.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Second-degree price discrimination is a well-known phenomenon in the field of Industrial 
Organization, since it is present in many industries. For instance, non-linear pricing schemes 
are very common in the telecommunications industry, in insurance markets, or in railroad and 
airline industries. The corresponding problem of a monopolistic firm seeking to maximize 
profit by offering type-specific bundles that are voluntarily chosen by the appropriate type of 
consumer has been widely analyzed in the economic literature. Seminal papers are 
Spence (1977), Stiglitz (1977), Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984), or 
Spulber (1993). More recently, second-degree price discrimination has also been discussed in 
the context of duopolistic competition, yielding ambiguous effects of price discrimination on 
profits. The most relevant paper dealing with this topic is Stole (1995), whereas 
Armstrong (2006a) and Stole (2007) survey this literature.  
 
The economic literature mentioned above refers to the case of traditional one-sided markets, 
while many industries operate on two-sided markets, i.e. markets where platforms enable 
interaction between two distinct groups of agents. Examples for two-sided networks are 
manifold: Real estate agencies facilitate interaction between house buyers and sellers, credit 
card companies establish a simple way of payments between consumers and merchants, 
whereas media platforms allow advertisers to interact with media consumers. The economics 
of two-sided markets has been extensively analyzed in the economic literature. While Roche 
and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), and Armstrong (2006b) analyze 
monopolistic and duopolistic price-setting behaviour in more general two-sided frameworks, 
Anderson and Coate (2005), Gabszewicz et al. (2004), Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), and Peitz 
and Valletti (2008)) specifically focus on media markets.  
So far, only little attention has been given to non-linear pricing strategies on two-sided 
markets. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Armstrong (2006b) analyze the case of group-
specific prices, i.e. third-degree price discrimination, whereas two-part tariffs are considered 
by Roche and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006b), and Reisinger (2010). In addition, Liu and 
Serfes (2008) study first-degree price discrimination on a two-sided duopolistic market. To 
our knowledge, second-degree price discrimination so far has not been analyzed in the context 
of two-sided networks. However, offering type-specific bundles for different types of agents 
is very common in two-sided industries. For instance, movie theatres offer multi-ticket 
bundles or even flat-rates, pay-TV platforms sell different combinations of content and price, 
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while online dating platforms allow men to subscribe for, e.g., one month, six months, or one 
year with a decreasing price per month. Recently, second-degree price discrimination became 
particularly relevant in the newspaper industry as many newspaper companies started to 
additionally offer their content on the internet. Here, different strategies can be observed. 
While some companies simply offer identical content via pay-per-view access, others publish 
reduced content, e.g. shortened articles or original articles with a significant time delay, 
without charging any price, but exposing readers to advertising. Compared to the traditional 
printed newspaper, this may well be interpreted as a different bundle that contains quality-
reduced content for a lower price. Surprisingly, it can also be observed that some newspapers, 
e.g. Germany’s best-selling newspaper “Bild”, regularly publish exclusive print media content 
(e.g. exclusive stories or soccer trade rumors) without any quality reduction on the internet 
free of charge, generating revenues from advertising only.    
 
It is the aim of this paper to make a first step in analyzing second-degree price discrimination 
on monopolistic two-sided markets. Tailored around the examples mentioned above, we will 
develop a simple framework with asymmetric information on one of its two market sides. 
This specific side of the market is supposed to consist of two distinct types of agents with 
different valuations regarding the intrinsic utility they obtain from joining the platform. As 
per usual, the agents’ utility on either side of the market is also affected from indirect network 
externalities.  
We will show that many of the well-known results from second-degree price discrimination 
on one-sided markets still prevail in our two-sided framework. However, in contrast to the 
“no-distortion-at-the-top” result from one-sided markets, we find that due to the two-
sidedness of the market, the profit-maximizing quantity for high-demand agents is strictly 
reduced under incomplete information. In addition, our findings indicate that if the interaction 
with agents from the opposite market side depends on the chosen bundle, it is a feasible 
optimal solution that the bundle for low-demand agents is more expensive than the bundle for 
high-demand agents.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we will develop the analytical framework, 
whereas Section 3 analyzes the price setting behaviour of a monopolistic platform operator. In 
this context we will discuss the benchmark case of complete information and compare our 
results to the case of incomplete information. Section 4 follows the same structure, but 
imposes bundle-specific interaction, i.e. the extent of interaction will depend on the chosen 
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bundle. In Section 5, we will summarize our findings and the contribution of our paper. In 
addition, we will suggest directions for further research. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
 
In the following section, we will develop a benchmark model of a monopolistic platform 
operator that operates on a two-sided market. Our theoretical framework considers two market 
sides k = 1,2, where market side 1 consists of two distinct groups of agents, labelled H and L. 
Agents of both groups differ in their intrinsic valuation for joining the platform. While the 
agents know their individual type, the platform operator is not able to distinguish agents with 
respect to their type. Hence, except for the benchmark case, this situation is characterized by 
asymmetric information. 
  
The agents’ utility is supposed to consist of two elements: an intrinsic utility that depends on 
each agent’s access to the platform, denoted by 1n , as well as an indirect network effect from 
the presence of market side 2 agents and the total payment t. The corresponding utility 
function is assumed to be additive-separable and can be described by 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2, , . H,Li ii i i iU n n t u n n t iθ α= ⋅ − ⋅ − = , 
where u(.) represents the utility from joining the platform, θ reflects the type-dependent 
valuation, and α denotes the indirect network externality resulting from the presence of 2n  
market side 2 agents. For 0>α , the network externality is negative, while 0<α  implies an 
additional benefit for agents on market side 1 from interacting with agents from the opposite 
market side. In addition, we assume  ( ) 0. >′u , ( ) 0. <′′u  and H Lθ θ> , whereas the absolute 
number of agents in each group is set to one. The latter assumption implies that our results 
will be independent from the type distribution of agents, which allows for an analysis that is 
strictly focused on the effects resulting from extending the problem from one-sided markets to 
two-sided markets.  
Market side 2 is characterized by a traditional downward sloping demand function ( )pnn i ,12 , 
where p denotes the price that all agents on this market side have to pay, in order to join the 
platform. Since we assumed that the absolute number of agents on market side 1 is fixed, 
agents on market side 2 do not care about the total number of agents from market side 1, but 
about the extent of their access to the platform. This implies that a potential benefit from 
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interaction is assumed to depend on the extent of the interaction process.1 If the externality is 
positive, we have 0
1
2 >∂∂ inn , while a negative indirect network effect implies 012 <∂
∂
in
n . As the 
demand function was supposed to be downward sloping in prices, we assume that 02 <∂∂ pn . 
Additional assumptions are 2 2
1 1
∂ ∂
∂ ∂=L Hn nn n , and the existence of a unique interior solution, i.e. it is 
supposed that both types of agents on market side 1 are served in the optimum. 
 
Reservation utility of market side 1 agents is supposed to be 0=iU . The cost function of the 
monopolistic platform operator is assumed to consist of constant marginal cost, c, for each 
unit of access to market side 1. In order to simplify the analysis, total costs on market side 2 
are assumed to be equal to zero. The resulting cost function is given by 
( )1 1 1 1,L H L HC n n c n c n= ⋅ + ⋅ . 
Our theoretical framework refers to the extent of platform access that is sold to agents on 
market side 1, which may well be interpreted as being equivalent to selling different quantities 
of a consumption good to different types of consumers. This allows for a comparison of our 
results to the well-known second-degree price discrimination outcome from traditional one-
sided markets.  
 
3. Model Analysis 
 
The benchmark case of complete information 
Under complete information, the monopolist maximizes profits by selling a type-specific 
bundle of platform access and payment to each type of agents on market side 1. It must be 
taken into account that both types must be willing to accept their offer (participation 
constraints). Hence, the maximization problem can be described by 
(1) ( )
1 1
1 1 2 1 1
, , , ,
max , ,Π = + − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
L H
L H
L H L H
L H
t t n n p
t t c n c n p n n n p  
s.t. 
(1a) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1, , 0⋅ − ⋅ − ≥L L HL Lu n n n n p tθ α , 
(1b) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1, , 0⋅ − ⋅ − ≥H L HH Hu n n n n p tθ α . 
Obviously, the participation constraints have to be binding in the optimum as the platform 
operator is able to exploit the entire consumer surplus. Therefore, Lt  and Ht  in (1) can be 
substituted by (1a) and (1b), which leads to the Lagrangian 
                                                     
1 For instance, on media markets this assumption corresponds to the well-known concept of “persuasive 
advertising“.  
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(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2 1 1 2
, ,
max . . .= ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
L H
L H L H
L H
n n p
L u n n u n n c n c n p nθ α θ α  
with the first-order conditions  
(3) ( ) 2
1 1 1
2 0∂∂ ∂= ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂LL L L
nL u p c
n n n
θ α , 
(4) ( ) 2
1 1 1
2 0∂∂ ∂= ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂HH H H
nL u p c
n n n
θ α , 
(5) ( )? ( ) ?
2
2
0 0(!)
0
. 2 0
> > <
∂∂ = + − ⋅ ⋅ =∂ ∂?????
nL n p
p p
α . 
Since ( ) 0.2 >n  and 02 <∂∂ pn , we can immediately conclude from equation (5) that an interior 
solution requires ( ) 02 >α⋅−p . Then, respecting the assumptions specified in Section 2, 
equations (3) to (5) implicitly define the uniqe interior solution ( )**1*1 ,, pnn HL .  
 
As per usual, the monopolist’s profit is maximized where marginal profit is equal to zero. 
However, it is not surprising that our results are more complex than the analog outcome on 
one-sided markets as the marginal profit also accounts for the arising network externalities. 
Since we know that ( ) 02 >α⋅−p , it is obvious that in case of 0
1
2 >∂∂ inn , i = H,L , a marginal 
increase in in1  generates additional profit, whereas for 0
1
2 <∂∂ inn  each additional unit of in1  has a 
negative impact on marginal profit. 
Comparing equations (3) and (4), while taking into account that 2 2
1 1
∂ ∂
∂ ∂=L Hn nn n  and H Lθ θ> , it is 
easy to verify that the marginal profit from an additional unit of access for the H-type, Hn1 , 
strictly exceeds the marginal profit from an increase in Ln1 . Hence, we know that in the 
optimum *1
*
1
LH nn >  must hold, which is in line with the corresponding result from one-sided 
markets. As we know that (1a) as well as (1b) are binding in the optimum, profit-maximizing 
tariffs are given by 
( ) ( )* * * * *1 2 1 1, ,L L HL Lt u n n n n pθ α= ⋅ − ⋅ , 
( ) ( )* * * * *1 2 1 1, ,H L HH Ht u n n n n pθ α= ⋅ − ⋅ . 
Therefore, respecting that H Lθ θ>  and *1*1 LH nn > , we can conclude that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * * * * * *1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,H L H L L HH H L Lt u n n n n p t u n n n n pθ α θ α= ⋅ − ⋅ > = ⋅ − ⋅ . 
 
Obviously, under complete information there is no qualitative difference in the results of our 
two-sided markets model when compared to the corresponding outcome of the second-degree 
price discrimination problem on one-sided markets: The type-specific bundle for the H-type 
contains more platform access and a higher payment than the one for the L-type. 
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The case of incomplete information 
In the case of asymmetric information, the monopolistic platform operator is not able to 
distinguish the type of market side 1 agents. Hence, it must be taken into account that each 
type of agent on market side 1 must be willing to voluntarily choose its designated bundle 
(incentive constraints). With incentive and participation constraints, the corresponding 
optimization problem is given by  
(6) ( )
1 1
1 1 2 1 1
, , , ,
max , ,Π = + − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
L H
L H
L H L H
L H
t t n n p
t t c n c n p n n n p  
s.t. 
(6a) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1, , 0⋅ − ⋅ − ≥L L HL Lu n n n n p tθ α , 
(6b) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1, , 0⋅ − ⋅ − ≥H L HH Hu n n n n p tθ α , 
(6c) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,⋅ − ⋅ − ≥ ⋅ − ⋅ −L L H H L HL L L Hu n n n n p t u n n n n p tθ α θ α , 
(6d) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,⋅ − ⋅ − ≥ ⋅ − ⋅ −H L H L L HH H H Lu n n n n p t u n n n n p tθ α θ α . 
 
Using equations (6a) and (6d) as well as H Lθ θ> , we find that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,H L H L L HH H H Lu n n n n p t u n n n n p tθ α θ α⋅ − ⋅ − ≥ ⋅ − ⋅ −  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1, , 0 , , 0L L H H L HL L H Hu n n n n p t u n n n n p tθ α θ α> ⋅ − ⋅ − ≥ ⇒ ⋅ − ⋅ − > , 
which implies that the participation constraint for the H-type is never binding. Hence, this 
restriction can be ignored with respect to the optimization process, so that the resulting Kuhn-
Tucker problem is formally described by 
(7) ( )
1 1 1 2 3
1 1 2 1 1
, , , , , , ,
max , ,= + − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
L H
L H
L H L H
L H
t t n n p
L t t c n c n p n n n p
λ λ λ
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1, ,L L H L HL L L L L Hu n n n n p t u n t u n tλ θ α λ θ θ   + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ +     
( ) ( )3 1 1H LH H H Lu n t u n tλ θ θ + ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ +  , 
leading to the first-order conditions 
(8) 1 2 31 0
∂ = − − + =∂ L
L
t
λ λ λ , 
(9) 2 31 0
∂ = + − =∂ H
L
t
λ λ , 
(10) ( ) ( ) 21 2 3 1
1 1 1 1
0∂∂ ∂ ∂= + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂L HL L L L
nL u u p c
n n n n
λ λ θ λ θ λ α , 
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(11) ( ) 23 2 1
1 1 1 1
0∂∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂H LH H H H
nL u u p c
n n n n
λ θ λ θ λ α , 
(12) ( ) ( ) 22 1. 0∂∂ = + − ⋅ ⋅ =∂ ∂
nL n p
p p
λ α . 
 
Since the Kuhn-Tucker conditions require 0mλ ≥ , m = 1,2,3, we find from equations (8) and 
(9) that a solution is characterized by 1 2λ = , 2 0λ = , and 3 1λ = . Therefore, the remaining 
first-order conditions become  
(13) ( ) 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 0∂∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂L HL L L L
nL u u p c
n n n n
θ θ α , 
(14) ( ) 2
1 1 1
2 0∂∂ ∂= ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂HH H H
nL u p c
n n n
θ α , 
(15) ( )? ( ) ?
2
2
0 0(!)
0
. 2 0
> > <
∂∂ = + − ⋅ ⋅ =∂ ∂?????
nL n p
p p
α . 
Equation (15) immediately implies that an interior solution still requires ( ) 02 >α⋅−p  as was 
already the case under complete information. Assuming that ( ) 02 >α⋅−p  holds, the unique 
interior solution ( )** ** **1 1, ,L Hn n p  of the maximization problem under incomplete information 
is implicitly described by the equation system (13) to (15). 
 
Since H Lθ θ> , it is easy to show that 
(16) ( )
1 1 1 1
2 2L H L H LL L L L
u u u u
n n n n
θ θ θ θ θ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ − < ⋅∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . 
As we have additionally assumed that 2 2
1 1
∂ ∂
∂ ∂=L Hn nn n , we know from comparing equations (13) and 
(14) that 
1 1
∂ ∂
∂ ∂>H LL Ln n . Therefore, we can conclude that ** **1 1>H Ln n  must hold in the optimum, so 
that the monopolist still offers a higher extent of platform access to the high-demand agents. 
Interpreting the Kuhn-Tucker conditions shows that the participation constraint for the L-type 
and the incentive constraint for the H-type are binding in the optimum. Using (6a) and (6d), 
the optimal payments are therefore given by 
( ) ( )** ** ** ** **1 2 1 1, ,L L HL Lt u n n n n pθ α= ⋅ − ⋅  
( ) ( )** ** ** **1 1H LH H H Lt u n u n tθ θ= ⋅ − ⋅ + , 
which immediately implies that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )** ** ** ** ** **1 1 1 1
0
0H L H LH L H H Ht t u n u n u n u nθ θ θ
>
− = ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ − >????????? . 
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Obviously, under incomplete information we still find that the bundle for the H-type contains 
more platform access and a higher payment compared to the bundle for the L-type. In 
addition, we can conclude from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that the L-type’s consumer 
surplus in the optimium is equal to zero, while the H-type enjoys a strictly positive consumer 
surplus. Since (6d) is binding in the optimum, we know that the H-type is indifferent between 
buying the bundles offered. The results obtained so far are entirely consistent with the 
corresponding findings on one-sided markets.  
 
Comparing the outcomes 
The final step in analyzing the model is to compare the results under incomplete information 
to the benchmark case of complete information. On one-sided markets this comparison 
produces the well-known “no-distortion-at-the-top” rule, i.e. one finds that in case of 
assymetric information, the bundle for low-demand consumers contains less quantity than 
under complete information, while high-demand consumers are provided with the efficient 
quantity. The corresponding findings of our two-sided market model are summarized in 
Proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1: Under incomplete information, the profit-maximizing amount of platform 
access for L-type agents is strictly smaller than under complete information, while the optimal 
level of platform access for H-type agents is also strictly below the benchmark level, which 
contradicts the findings from one-sided markets. This result is independent of the sign of the 
network externality exerted on market side 2 agents.  
Proof: First, we consider the case of positive indirect network externalities on market side 2, 
i.e. 2 2
1 1
0L H
n n
n n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂= > . Using (16) as well as equations (3) and (13), we find that 
(17) ( ) ( )2 2
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2L L HL L L L L
n nu u up c p c
n n n n n
θ α θ θ α∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − > ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , 
which implies that the optimal amount of platform access for low-demand agents on market 
side 1 is ceteris paribus smaller under incomplete information than under complete 
information. This effect has an additional impact on the demand of market side 2 agents, 
which in turn influences the profit-maximizing price that is charged on market side 2. The 
optimal prices *p  and **p  were implicitly determined by equations (5) and (15). 
Differentiating (5) or (15) with respect to 1
Ln  and additionally assuming 
2
2
1
0Lnp n
∂
∂ ∂ =  yields  
( ) ( ) 22 2 2
1 1 1
0 0
.
2 0L L L
n nL p
p n n p n
α
> =
∂ ∂∂ = + − ⋅ ⋅ >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂??? ???
, 
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which allows us to conclude that ** *p p< , so that the optimal price on market side 2 is 
strictly smaller than in the benchmark case of complete information. Since p simultaneously 
enters equation (13), it follows that the marginal profit from an increase in Ln1  is additionally 
reduced under incomplete information. Hence, we find that ** *1 1
L Ln n< . At the same time p 
also enters equation (14), which leads to a decrease in the marginal profit generated from an 
additional unit 1
Hn . Therefore, we obtain ** *1 1
H Hn n< . 
If we consider the case of 2 2
1 1
0L H
n n
n n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂= < , we find that (17) still holds, which again implies that 
1
Ln  is ceteris paribus reduced under incomplete information. Due to the negative network 
externality on market side 2, this effect leads to an increase in the demand of market side 2 
agents. Assuming 
2
2
1
0Lnp n
∂
∂ ∂ = , the corresponding impact on **p  is described by 
( ) ( ) 22 2 2
1 1 1
0 0
.
2 0L L L
n nL p
p n n p n
α
< =
∂ ∂∂ = + − ⋅ ⋅ <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂??? ???
, 
which obviously implies that ** *p p> . Using (13) and (14), and respecting that an interior 
solution requires ( ) 02 >α⋅−p , it follows that ** *1 1L Ln n<  as well as ** *1 1H Hn n< . 
(q.e.d.) 
 
The economic intuition behind our findings is straightforward: The monopolistic platform 
operator is maximizing her profit by inducing a self-selection process among both types of 
agents on market side 1. Therefore, the bundle of platform access and payment that is sold to 
low-demand agents ceteris paribus contains less platform access than under complete 
information as this allows the platform operator to extract additional consumer surplus from 
high-demand agents. This result is well-known from second-degree price discrimination on 
one-sided markets. However, the reduction of Ln1  induces an additional effect on the opposite 
market side as the demand of market side 2 agents was supposed to depend on Ln1  and 1
Hn . 
For instance, assume a positive network externality exerted on market side 2. Then, a 
reduction of Ln1  shifts the demand function ( )2 1 1, ,L Hn n n p  inwards, which reduces the optimal 
price **p  that is charged on market side 2. This in turn makes a marginal increase in Ln1  even 
less profitable, so that the profit-maximizing extent of platform access for low-demand agents 
is strictly smaller under incomplete information. In addition, the reduction of **p  also affects 
**
1
Hn  as each marginal unit of platform access for high-demand agents generates less marginal 
profit than under complete information. This effect strictly reduces **1
Hn  below the benchmark 
level, which contradicts the corresponding results from one-sided markets, where the quantity 
for high-demand consumers was not affected under incomplete information. 
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The outcome of the second-degree price discrimination problem on one-sided markets may 
also serve as an alternative benchmark for a comparison with our results under incomplete 
information. The case of one-sided markets is equivalent to the special case of our model 
where 0α =  and 2 2
1 1
0L Hn nn n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂= = . In this special case, equations (13) and (14) become   
( )
1 1 1 1
2 2 0 0 0L H LL L L L
L u u up c c
n n n n
θ θ θ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − = ⇔ ⋅ >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , 
( )
1 1 1
2 0 0 0H HH H H
L u up c c
n n n
θ θ∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − = ⇔ ⋅ =∂ ∂ ∂ , 
which reproduces the “no-distortion-at-the-top” outcome from one-sided markets. We will 
denote this specific solution by ( )1 1ˆ ˆ,L Hn n .  
If we consider the case of 0α ≠  and 2 2
1 1
0L Hn nn n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂= > , while additionally respecting ( ) 02 >α⋅−p , we find by using (13) and (14) that  
( ) ( )
?
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 10
0
2 2 0 2L H LL L L L L L
n nL u u up c p c
n n n n n n
θ θ α θ α
>
>
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − = ⇔ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂????? , 
( )
?
2
1 1 1 10
0
2 0H HH H H H
nL u up c c
n n n n
θ α θ
>
>
∂∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − = ⇔ ⋅ <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂????? , 
which implies that **1 1ˆ
L Ln n>  as well as **1 1ˆH Hn n> . It is easy to verify that for 0α ≠  and 
2 2
1 1
0L Hn nn n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂= < , we find the opposite result, that is **1 1ˆL Ln n<  and **1 1ˆH Hn n< .  
The economic intuition behind our results is rather simple: In case of positive network 
externalities on market side 2, i.e. 2 2
1 1
0L Hn nn n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂= > , each additional unit of 1Ln  and 1Hn  generates 
additional marginal profit. Hence, the monopolist strictly increases the amount of platform 
access in both bundles compared to the solution under asymmetric information on one-sided 
markets. In the optimum, we find that the H-type’s marginal willingness to pay for **1
Hn  is 
strictly below marginal cost, which implies that high-demand agents on market side 1 are 
subsidized in any case. Under specific parameter sets, the same even holds for low-demand 
agents. Considering the case of 2 2
1 1
0L Hn nn n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂= < , we find the opposite: A marginal increase in 1Ln  
and 1
Hn  leads to additional marginal cost, thus inducing the monopolistic platform operator to 
strictly reduce the extent of platform access sold to each type of agents on market side 1. 
 
4. A Model with bundle-specific Interaction  
 
So far, we have assumed that both types of agents on market side 1 are equivalently affected 
by the presence of market side 2 agents. In this section, we will extend the analysis by 
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including bundle-specific interaction, i.e. the extent of the indirect externality depends on the 
chosen bundle. For instance, consider an online dating platform that sells different pairs of 
platform access and payments to two distinct types of market side 1 agents (men) with 
different valuations, while market side 2 agents (women) are generally allowed to join the 
platform for free. Then, it could be the case that the L-type bundle only allows market side 1 
agents to contact a limited number of agents from the opposite market side, whereas the 
bundle for high-demand agents contains unlimited access. 
We will account for this by imposing a different utility function for agents on market side 1. 
This function is still supposed to be additive separable and takes the form 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 2, , . H,Li i ii i i iU n n t u n n n t iθ α= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − = , 
while the notation introduced in Section 2 remains the same. In addition, all assumptions 
made so far are still valid. The motivation behind this model specification stems from the 
movie theatre example mentioned in Section 1. Assume that a cinema operator offers two 
bundles: The L-type bundle contains a single ticket for a specific price, while the H-type 
bundle includes 5 tickets for a total payment that implies a per ticket price below the price of 
the single ticket. If both types of consumers buy their designated bundles, the L-type is only 
once exposed to the cinema-specific amount of advertising, while the H-type watches the 
same amount of advertising five times.  
 
Profit maximization under complete information 
In case of symmetric information, the monopolistic platform operator is again able to 
perfectly discriminate between both types of agents on market side 1 by selling type-specific 
bundles ( )1 2, ,i in n t , as take-it-or-leave-it offers. Respecting the participation constraints, the 
corresponding optimization problem is given by 
(18) ( )
1 1
1 1 2 1 1
, , , ,
max , ,
L H
L H
L H L H
L H
t t n n p
t t c n c n p n n n pΠ = + − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅  
s.t. 
(18a) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1, , 0L L L HL Lu n n n n n p tθ α⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ≥ , 
(18b) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1, , 0H H L HH Hu n n n n n p tθ α⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ≥ . 
As we have already mentioned in Section 2, perfect price discrimination implies that the 
consumer surplus for market side 1 agents is equal to zero. Hence, we know that the 
participation constraints are binding in the optimum, so that the maximization problem 
simplifies to a Lagrangian of the form  
 13
(19) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 2 1 1 2
, ,
max . .
L H
L L H H
L H
n n p
L u n n n u n n nθ α θ α= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅  
( )1 1 2 .L Hc n c n p n− ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ , 
yielding the first-order conditions 
(20) ( ) ( )( ) 22 1 1
1 1 1
. 0L HLL L L
nL u n p n n c
n n n
θ α α ∂∂ ∂= ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂ , 
(21) ( ) ( )( ) 22 1 1
1 1 1
. 0L HHH H H
nL u n p n n c
n n n
θ α α ∂∂ ∂= ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂ , 
(22) ( )? ( )( ) ?22 1 10 0(!) 0
. 0L H nL n p n n
p p
α
> > <
∂∂ = + − ⋅ + ⋅ =∂ ∂???????? . 
Since all assumptions from the previous sections are still holding, we can conclude from 
equation (22) that a feasible solution requires ( )( )1 1 0L Hp n nα− ⋅ + > . Assuming that an 
interior solution exists, this solution is implicitly characterized by equations (20) – (22) and 
will be denoted by ( )* * *1 1, ,L Hn n p? ? ? . 
 
Given our extension of bundle-specific interaction, it is not surprising that the effects resulting 
from the presence of a second market side are more complex than in the benchmark case of 
Section 3. Analysing equations (20) and (21) reveals that the first-order conditions reflect 
three different effects (apart from the traditional impact on the marginal willingness to pay): 
First, a marginal change of in1  directly affects the demand of market side 2 agents, which in 
turn has an indirect impact on the marginal profit generated on this market side. In addition, a 
different number of market side 2 agents influences the utility of both types of market side 1 
agents and hence their willingness to pay. These two (indirect) effects are reflected by the 
term ( )( )1 1 2 1L H Lp n n n nα− ⋅ + ⋅∂ ∂  and are in line with our findings from the benchmark case 
of Section 3. However, in case of bundle-specific interaction there is an additional effect from 
a marginal change of in1  as type i’s utility on market side 1 is directly affected, because the 
extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side changes. This additional effect 
is reflected by the expression ( )2 .nα− ⋅ . 
Since we assumed that H Lθ θ>  and 2 2
1 1
∂ ∂
∂ ∂=L Hn nn n , it is easy to see by comparing equations (20) 
and (21) that the marginal profit from an additional unit 1
Hn  still exceeds the marginal profit 
from an increase in 1
Ln , i.e. 
1 1
H L
L L
n n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂> . Therefore, we know that in the optimum it still holds 
that * *1 1
H Ln n>? ? , which corresponds to our findings from the previous section. In addition, we 
know that the participation constraints are binding in the optimum. Hence, using equations 
(18a) and (18b), the profit-maximizing tariffs for the type-specific bundles are given by 
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( ) ( )* * * * * *1 1 2 1 1, ,L L L HL Lt u n n n n n pθ α= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅? ? ? ? ? ? , 
( ) ( )* * * * * *1 1 2 1 1, ,H H L HH Ht u n n n n n pθ α= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅? ? ? ? ? ? . 
Therefore, the difference of payments is described by 
(23) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * * * * * * * *1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,H H L H L L L HH L H Lt t u n n n n n p u n n n n n pθ α θ α− = ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * * * * *1 1 2 1 1 1 1, ,H L L H L HH L H Lt t u n u n n n n p n nθ θ α⇔ − = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ −? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . 
 
So far, our results are not surprising as they are consistent with the results from Section 3. 
However, analyzing the relation of the bundle-specific payments yields an interesting result, 
denoted in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: Under complete information, the profit-maxmizing tariff for the H-type 
bundle strictly exceeds the optimal price-level for the L-type bundle if the indirect network 
externality exerted on market side 1 agents is positive or absent, i.e. 0α ≤ . In case of a 
negative network externality on market side 1, i.e. 0α > , it is a feasible profit-maximizing 
solution that the bundle for low-demand agents is more expensive than the one for high-
demand agents, even though the latter contains a strictly higher extent of platform access.  
Proof: Suppose 0α < . As we know that H Lθ θ>  as well as * *1 1H Ln n>? ? , we can immediately 
conclude from equation (23) that  
( ) ( ) ? ( ) ( )* * * * * * * * *1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0
0 0 0
, , 0H L L H L HH L H Lt t u n u n n n n p n nθ θ α
<> > <
− = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??????????? ??????? ????? . 
For 0α = , equation (23) becomes  
( ) ( )* * * *1 1
0
0H LH L H Lt t u n u nθ θ
>
− = ⋅ − ⋅ >? ? ? ??????????? , 
which closes the proof for the first part of Proposition 2.  
In case of a negative indirect network effect, i.e. 0α > , we find by using (23) that 
( ) ( ) ? ( ) ( )* * * * * * * * *1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0
0 0 0
, ,H L L H L HH L H Lt t u n u n n n n p n nθ θ α
>> > <
− = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ −? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??????????? ??????? ????? , 
which obviously implies that * *H Lt t−? ?  can be either positive, negative or equal to zero. In order 
to prove that * * 0H Lt t− <? ?  is feasible in the optimum, we have to show that  
( ) ( ) ? ( ) ( )* * * * * * *1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0
0 0 0
, , 0H L L H L HH Lu n u n n n n p n nθ θ α
>> > <
⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − <? ? ? ? ? ? ??????????? ??????? ?????  
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is, at least under specific restrictions, in line with the first-order conditions. Suppose that 
H Lθ θ≈ . Then we have in the optimum that * *1 1L Hn n ε= −? ? , where 0ε >  is assumed to be very 
small. In this case, it approximately holds that 
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 1
* * * * * *
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1H L
H L L H H L
H L H LH L
n n
u uu n u n n n n n
n n
θ θ θ θ∂ ∂⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ −∂ ∂? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?  
* * * *
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1H L H L
H L H LH L H L
n n n n
u u u u
n n n n
θ ε θ ε ε θ θ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ? ? ? ?
. 
Since an optimal solution requires  
* *
1 1
1 1H L
H LH L
n n
u u
n n
θ θ∂ ∂⋅ = ⋅∂ ∂? ?
, 
we find by using (23) that * *H Lt t−? ?  can be expressed as  
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 1
* *
2 2
1 1
2 . 2 .
H H
H L H HH H
n n
u ut t n n
n n
θ ε α ε ε θ α ∂ ∂ − = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ∂ ∂ ? ?
? ? . 
Hence, we have that  
( ) ( )
* *
1 1
* *
2 2
1 1
0 2 . 0 2 .
H H
H L H HH H
n n
u ut t n n
n n
θ α θ α∂ ∂− < ⇔ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ < ⇔ ⋅ ⋅ < ⋅∂ ∂? ?
? ? . 
By analyzing the first-order conditions, in particular equation (21), we can conclude that this 
inequality is satisfied in the optimum, if and only if it is true that 
(24) ( )( ) ?
* *
1 1
* * * 2
1 1
01 1
0
0(!) 0
H H
L H
HH H
n n
n up n n c
n n
α θ
>
>
> >
∂ ∂− ⋅ + ⋅ − > ⋅∂ ∂? ?
? ? ?
????????? ??? ?????
, 
which obviously only holds for 2
1
0Hnn
∂
∂ > . 
(q.e.d.) 
 
The results of Proposition 2 are surprising, since they contradict the standard result from one-
sided markets where the monopolist in any case charges a higher tariff for the H-type bundle. 
However, in case of bundle-specific interaction on a two-sided market, the optimization 
problem is more complex: Considering the case of H Lθ θ≈ , we can conclude from (24), that 
* * 0H Lt t− <? ?  requires a specific relation between the term ( )( ) 2
1
* * *
1 1 H
nL H
n
p n nα ∂∂− ⋅ + ⋅? ? ?  and the 
marginal cost c as their difference must be sufficiently large. For 2
1
0Hnn
∂
∂ > , the expression ( )( ) 2
1
* * *
1 1 H
nL H
n
p n nα ∂∂− ⋅ + ⋅? ? ?  covers the (net) marginal profit that arises from the indirect impact 
of an increase in 1
Hn  on the demand of market side 2 agents. In case that this expression is 
very large, it implies that an additional unit 1
Hn  is particularly profitable due to the presence 
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of the opposite market side. If, on the other hand, c is very small, there is a strong incentive 
for the monopolist to choose 1
Hn  (as well as 1
Ln ) as large as possible. However, the platform 
operator is facing a difficult trade-off: For 0α > , any increase of 1Ln  and 1Hn  reduces the 
utility of market side 1 agents, but their participation is crucial in order to exploit the high 
marginal profits from market side 2. Therefore, the platform operator has to compensate both 
types of agents for their utility losses by reducing the bundle-specific payment. As we have 
found that * *1 1
H Ln n>? ? , we know that high-demand agents on market side 1 are facing a larger 
extent of utility reduction in the optimum, since the interaction with market side 2 agents is 
assumed to depend on the chosen bundle. Hence, in order to respect the participation 
constraints, the price reduction for the H-type bundle will exceed the one for the L-type 
bundle. In case that (24) holds, this process leads to the surprising result * *H Lt t<? ? . The 
economic intuition is as follows: As per usual, high- demand agents obtain more utility from 
joining the platform, i.e. it holds that ( ) ( )* *1 1H LH Lu n u nθ θ⋅ > ⋅? ? . At the same time they are 
facing more disutility from the presence of market side 2 agents, i.e. we have that 
( ) ( )* * * * * * * *1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,H L H L L Hn n n n p n n n n pα α⋅ ⋅ > ⋅ ⋅? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . If 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * * * * * *1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,H L H L H L L HH Lu n u n n n n n p n n n n pθ θ α α⋅ − ⋅ < ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? , 
which holds if (24) is satisfied, the platform operator has to compensate high-demand agents 
by choosing * *H Lt t<? ? . 
 
Optimization under incomplete information 
As was already discussed in Section 3, the monopolist has to respect the incentive constraints 
and the participation constraints when maximizing her profit under incomplete information. 
Hence, the corresponding (Kuhn-Tucker) optimization problem is described by 
(25) ( )
1 1
1 1 2 1 1
, , , ,
max , ,
L H
L H
L H L H
L H
t t n n p
t t c n c n p n n n pΠ = + − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅  
s.t. 
(25a) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1, , 0L L L HL Lu n n n n n p tθ α⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ≥ , 
(25b) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1, , 0H H L HH Hu n n n n n p tθ α⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ≥ , 
(25c) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,L L L H H H L HL L L Hu n n n n n p t u n n n n n p tθ α θ α⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ≥ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − , 
(25d) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,H H L H L L L HH H H Lu n n n n n p t u n n n n n p tθ α θ α⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ≥ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − . 
 
Respecting LH θ>θ , we find by using equations (25a) and (25d) that 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,H H L H L L L HH H H Lu n n n n n p t u n n n n n p tθ α θ α⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ≥ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ −  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1, , 0 , , 0L L L H H H L HL L H Hu n n n n n p t u n n n n n p tθ α θ α> ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ≥ ⇒ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − > . 
Hence, the participation constraint for high-demand agents can be disregarded as it is never 
binding. The resulting Kuhn-Tucker optimization problem is therefore given by 
(26) ( )
1 1 1 2 3
1 1 2 1 1
, , , , , , ,
max , ,
L H
L H
L H L H
L H
t t n n p
L t t c n c n p n n n p
λ λ λ
= + − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅  
( ) ( )1 1 1 2 1 1, ,L L L HL Lu n n n n n p t +λ ⋅ θ ⋅ − ⋅α ⋅ −   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,L L L H H H L HL L L Hu n n n n n p t u n n n n n p t +λ ⋅ θ ⋅ − ⋅α ⋅ − − θ ⋅ + ⋅α ⋅ +   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1, , , ,H H L H L L L HH H H Lu n n n n n p t u n n n n n p t +λ ⋅ θ ⋅ − ⋅α ⋅ − −θ ⋅ + ⋅α ⋅ +   
with the first-order conditions 
(27) 1 2 31 0
L
L
t
∂ = −λ −λ + λ =∂ , 
(28) 2 31 0
H
L
t
∂ = + λ −λ =∂ , 
(29) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21 2 3 2 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
. 0L HL L L L
nL u u n c
n n n n
λ λ θ λ θ α λ λ λ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + − +Ψ ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , 
(30) ( ) ( ) 23 2 2 3 2
1 1 1 1
. 0H LH H H H
nL u u n c
n n n n
λ θ λ θ α λ λ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − +Ψ ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , 
(31) ( ) 22 . 0nL np p
∂∂ = +Ψ ⋅ =∂ ∂ , 
where ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 2 3 1 3 2L Hp n nα λ λ λ λ λΨ = − ⋅ ⋅ + − + ⋅ − . 
 
Taking into account that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions require 0mλ ≥ , m = 1,2,3, equations 
(27) and (28) imply that in the optimum 1 2λ = , 2 0λ = , and 3 1λ =  must hold. Hence, 
equations (29) to (31) become  
(32) ( ) ( )( )
1
2
2 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 . 0
L
L
L H
L HL L L L
u n
nL u u n p n n c
n n n n
θ
θ θ α α
< ⋅∂ ∂
∂∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂?????????
, 
(33) ( ) ( )( ) 22 1 1
1 1 1
. 0L HHH H H
nL u n p n n c
n n n
θ α α ∂∂ ∂= ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ − =∂ ∂ ∂ , 
(34) ( )? ( )( ) ?22 1 10 0(!) 0
. 0L H nL n p n n
p p
α
> > <
∂∂ = + − ⋅ + ⋅ =∂ ∂???????? . 
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Obviously, we find from equation (34) that an interior solution still strictly requires that 
( )( )1 1 0L Hp n nα− ⋅ + > . Additionally assuming that both types of agents on market side 1 are 
served in the optimum, equations (32) - (34) determine the unique profit-maximizing solution 
( )** ** **1 1, ,L Hn n p? ? ? . 
 
Since LH θ>θ  and 2 2
1 1
∂ ∂
∂ ∂=L Hn nn n , we find by analyzing equations (32) and (33) that 1 1∂ ∂∂ ∂>H LL Ln n , 
which implies that the optimal level of platform access for high-demand agents still exceeds 
the one for low-demand agents, i.e. we have ** **1 1
H Ln n>? ? . From the Kuhn-Tucker constraints 
we can conclude that there is still no consumer surplus for the L-type, while the H-type is 
indifferent between both bundles and enjoys a strictly positive consumer surplus. These 
results are consistent with our findings from the previous section.. As we know that (25a) as 
well as (25d) are binding in the optimum, we find that the optimal payments are given by 
( ) ( )** ** ** ** ** **1 1 2 1 1, ,L L L HL Lt u n n n n n pθ α= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅? ? ? ? ? ?  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )** ** ** ** ** ** ** **1 1 2 1 1 1 1, ,H H L H L LH H H Lt u n n n n n p u n u nθ α θ θ= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . 
Hence, the price differential is expressed by 
(35) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **1 1 2 1 1 1 1, ,H L L H L HH L H Ht t u n u n n n n p n nθ θ α− = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ −? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . 
 
In the benchmark case of complete information we found that under specific restrictions the 
L-type bundle was more expensive than the H-type bundle. However, in case of asymmetric 
information, the monopolistic platform operator is not able to sell type-specific take-it-or-
leave-it offers to agents on market side 1, which potentially influences our results. The 
corresponding findings under incomplete information are summarized by Proposition 3: 
 
Proposition 3: In case of incomplete information, it holds in the optimum that the profit-
maximizing tariff for the H-type bundle is strictly larger than the payment for the L-type 
bundle if the presence of market side 2 agents exerts a nonnegative externality on both types 
of agents on market side 1, i.e. for 0α ≤ . For 0α > , the results are ambiguous, which implies 
that, under specific conditions, the price level of the L-type bundle exceeds the payment for 
the H-type bundle.  
Proof: First, we consider the case of positive network effects on market side 1, i.e. 0α < . 
Then, respecting ** **1 1
H Ln n>? ? , we find by using equation (35) that  
( ) ( ) ? ( ) ( )** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0
0 0 0
, , 0H L L H L HH L H Ht t u n u n n n n p n nθ θ α
<> > <
− = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???????????? ??????? ????? . 
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For 0α = , equation (35) simplifies to  
( ) ( )** ** ** **1 1
0
0H LH L H Ht t u n u nθ θ
>
− = ⋅ − ⋅ >? ? ? ???????????? , 
which proves the first statement that is contained in Proposition 3.  
Now, suppose that 0α > , which implies the presence of a negative indirect network 
externality exterted on market side 1 agents. In this case, we find from (35) that 
( ) ( ) ? ( ) ( )** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0
0 0 0
, ,H L L H L HH L H Ht t u n u n n n n p n nθ θ α
>> > <
− = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ −? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???????????? ??????? ????? , 
yielding ambiguous results, i.e. ** **H Lt t−? ?  can have any sign or is equal to zero. Showing that 
** ** 0H Lt t− <? ?  is feasible in the optimum, requires to verify that  
( ) ( ) ? ( ) ( )** ** ** ** ** ** **1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0
0 0 0
, , 0H L L H L HH Hu n u n n n n p n nθ θ α
>> > <
⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − <? ? ? ? ? ? ???????????? ??????? ?????  
is covered by the first-order conditions. We start the proof by assuming that H Lθ θ≈ . Hence, 
we have in the optimum that ** **1 1
L Hn n ε= −? ?  with 0ε >  being very small. By approximation, 
it holds that  
( ) ( ) ( )
** **
1 1
** ** ** **
1 1 1 1
1 1H H
H L H L
H H H HH H
n n
u uu n u n n n
n n
θ θ θ θ ε∂ ∂⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅ ⋅∂ ∂? ?
? ? ? ? . 
Then, using equation (35) we find that ** **H Lt t−? ?  can be described by 
( ) ( ) ( )
** **
1 1
* *
2 2
1 1
. .
H H
H L H HH H
n n
u ut t n n
n n
θ ε α ε ε θ α ∂ ∂ − = ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ∂ ∂ ? ?
? ? , 
which allows us to conclude that  
( ) ( )
** **
1 1
* *
2 2
1 1
0 . 0 .
H H
H L H HH H
n n
u ut t n n
n n
θ α θ α∂ ∂− < ⇔ ⋅ − ⋅ < ⇔ ⋅ < ⋅∂ ∂? ?
? ? . 
By analyzing (33) we find that this inequality is satisfied in the optimum if it holds that  
(36) ( )( ) ?
**
1
** ** ** 2
1 1
01
0
0(!)
0
H
L H
H
n
np n n c
n
α
>
>
>
∂− ⋅ + ⋅ − >∂ ?
? ? ?
????????? ???
, 
which strictly requires positive indirect network effects on market side 2, i.e. 2 2
1 1
0L Hn nn n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂= > . 
(q.e.d.) 
 
Proposition 3 shows that our results from the benchmark case of complete information prevail 
under incomplete information: It is still a feasible solution in the optimum that the L-type 
bundle is more expensive than the bundle for high-demand agents. This is not surprising as 
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we know that the H-type enjoys a strictly positive consumer surplus under incomplete 
information, while the monopolist extracts the entire consumer surplus in case of perfect price 
discrimination. Hence, in order to make high-demand agents better off than under complete 
information, the monopolistic platform operator ceteris paribus has an incentive to increase 
the H-type’s utility in the optimum by choosing **Ht?  below the level of the benchmark case. 
Therefore, as we already know that * * 0H Lt t− <? ?  is feasible under complete information, it is 
not surprising that this outcome prevails under incomplete information.  
 
Comparison with the benchmark case 
We will close the analysis by comparing our findings from the case of asymmetric 
information to the benchmark case of complete information. Proposition 4 contains the 
corresponding results. 
 
Proposition 4:  
Restricting the analysis to 2 2 2 2
1 1
i i
n n n n
n p n p
α∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂< < −  for the case of positive network effects on 
market side 2, i.e. 2
1
0inn
∂
∂ > , i = H,L, and 2 2 2 21 1i i
n n n n
n p n p
α∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− < <  for 21 0i
n
n
∂
∂ < , we find that under 
incomplete information, the optimal extent of platform access for low-demand agents is 
strictly smaller than the benchmark level, i.e. it holds that ** *1 1
L Ln n<? ? . In addition, the profit-
maximizing amount of platform access for high-demand agents is also negatively affected 
under incomplete information. Hence, we find that ** *1 1
H Hn n<? ? . Given the restrictions above, 
this result is robust with respect to the sign of the network effect on market side 2. 
Proof: We start by considering the case of 2
1
0inn
∂
∂ > . Since inequality (16) is still satisfied, it is 
easy to show by using equations (20) and (32) that the monopolistic platform operator under 
incomplete information ceteris paribus chooses a smaller amount of platform access for the 
L-type bundle. This effect induces a change in the demand of market side 2 agents, which in 
turn influences the profit-maximizing price **p  that is implictly given by equation (34). 
Differentiating (34) with respect to 1
Ln , while respecting that 2 2 2 2
1 1
i i
n n n n
n p n p
α∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂< < −  and 
2
2
1
0Lnp n
∂
∂ ∂ = , yields  
( )( ) 22 2 2 21 1
1 1 1
0
0L HL L L
n n nL p n n
p n n p n p
α α
=
∂ ∂ ∂∂ = + − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂???
, 
which immediately implies that ** *p p< . This reduction has an additional effect on the 
optimal amount of platform access for L-type agents. By solving (34) for ( )2 .n  we obtain  
( ) ( )( ) 22 1 1. L H nn p n n pα ∂= − − ⋅ + ⋅ ∂ , 
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so that equation (32) can be reformulated as  
( )( ) 2 21 1
1 1 1 1
0
0
2 0L HL HL L L L
n nL u u p n n c
n n n p n
θ θ α α
> >
 ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + − = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ???????? ???????
. 
Taking into account that 2 2 2 2
1 1
i i
n n n n
p pn n
α∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂< < − , this allows us to conclude that ** *1 1L Ln n<? ? . 
Since **p  simultaneously enters equation (33), it can be analogously shown that ** *1 1
H Hn n<? ? . 
For 2
1
0inn
∂
∂ < , the proof follows the same logic, but requires 2 2 2 21 1i i
n n n n
n p n p
α∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− < < . 
(q.e.d.) 
 
Proposition 4 confirms our findings from Section 3 and shows that our results are still holding 
in case of bundle-specific interaction. The logic behind our findings remains the same as in 
Section 3: Under incomplete information, the monopolist ceteris paribus has an incentive to 
reduce the optimal extent of platform access for low-demand agents below the benchmark 
level, in order to make this bundle less attractive for high-demand agents. Thus, the firm is 
able to extract additional consumer surplus from the H-type on market side 1. However, for 
2
1
0inn
∂
∂ >  the reduction of 1Ln  has a negative influence on the demand of market side 2 agents, 
which additionally reduces the marginal profit from an additional unit of 1
Ln . Hence, there is a 
second effect that reduces the optimal amount of platform access for low-demand agents on 
market side 1. At the same time this effect has an impact on the marginal profit that is 
generated from an additional unit 1
Hn . Since each unit 1
Hn  becomes less profitable due to the 
reduced demand on market side 2, the profit-maximizing extent of platform access that is 
provided to the H-type is also stricly below the benchmark level.  
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
 
The present paper provides a positive analysis of second-degree price discrimination on a 
monopolistic two-sided market. We found that many of the results from the equivalent 
problem on one-sided markets are still valid in our two-sided setting: The extent of platform 
access (which may well be interpreted as quality) for low-demand agents is strictly reduced 
under incomplete information, in order to induce the well-known self-selection process 
among agents on market side 1, while allowing the monopolist to extract additional consumer 
surplus from high-demand agents. In addition, in the optimum agents with low valuation are 
still left without any consumer surplus, whereas high-demand agents are in any case 
indifferent between the two bundles, while enjoying an information rent. 
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However, the paper contributes to the existing literature by revealing some important 
differences in relation to the second-degree price discrimination problem on one-sided 
markets: In Section 3, we found that the famous “no-distortion-at-the-top”-rule from one-
sided markets does not prevail in our two-sided framework, since our analysis yielded that 
** *
1 1
H Hn n< , i.e. under incomplete information, the extent of platform access for the H-type is 
strictly below the level under complete information. In the subsequent analysis of Section 4 it 
was also shown that this result is robust with respect to the model specification of bundle-
specific interaction. This result implies that the monopolistic optimization problem is more 
complex in the presence of network externalities as the ceteris paribus profit-enhancing 
reduction of 1
Ln  has an impact on the demand of market side 2 agents, which in turn 
(negatively) affects the marginal profit generated from an additional unit 1
Hn . 
The analysis of Section 4 implied another important result: In case of bundle-specific 
interaction, it is a feasible profit-maximizing solution that the bundle for the L-type is more 
expensive than the one for the H-type, which contradicts the findings from one-sided markets. 
This surprising result holds for the case of complete information and prevails under 
incomplete information. Interpreting these findings sheds some new light on the examples 
provided in Section 1. For instance, recall the case of German newspaper “Bild” that offers 
exclusive print media content on the internet free of charge, but in combination with 
advertising. Since the online content is identical to the content of the printed newspaper, there 
is no quality reduction, but a significant amount of advertising consisting of numerous banner 
ads and links. Intuitively, one would expect that offering the online content “for free” targets 
low-demand agents, since they do not have to pay for being able to read the same content that 
is offered in the print medium. However, respecting the results of Propositions 2 and 3, it may 
well be the case that the combination of free online access and higher advertising levels is a 
designated bundle for high-demand agents. This is supported by the following consideration: 
If we assume that high-demand agents on a newspaper market have a strong preference for 
receiving exclusive news as soon as possible, the results of our model would strictly require 
publishing any information on the internet at first. This can indeed be observed as the articles 
of “Bild” are usually published on the internet the night before the printed newspaper is sold. 
 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the focus of our analysis is exclusively positive, so that we 
are not able to draw any normative conclusions with respect to the welfare aspects of the 
second-degree price discrimination problem on a two-sided market. Extending the analysis by 
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welfare considerations or a second group of agents on market side 2 remains the task for 
further research.  
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